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My aim in this essay is to explore certain parallels—concerning 
anthropomorphism—in the work of Roger Caillois, Hans Jonas, Theodor Adorno 
and Sigmund Freud. Both Caillois (a thinker closely connected to French 
Surrealism and an important source for Jacques Lacan) and Jonas (philosopher 
and one-time student of Heidegger) take issue with the ban on 
anthropomorphism—an anathema that is the legacy of Western science. Part of 
the thesis in Jonas’ major work, The Phenomenon of Life, is that freedom is not 
exclusively a human quality but a potential within the simplest organic forms, 
even within inorganic matter. Anthropomorphism may be the legacy of a primitive 
stage in human development in which the whole of creation was endowed with a 
soul, but this attitude, Jonas argues, is the more natural one. Whereas in the 
early phases of humanity death was the stranger in a world that was 
fundamentally alive, modern thinking made life the riddle within a world of neutral 
matter and mechanistic principles. Freud’s own theory of the death-drive (“an 
urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the living 
entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing 
forces”) seems quite consistent with the primacy of death over life instituted by 
modern thought. I have a general interest in comparing Freud’s theory of the 
death drive, the aim of which is the restoration of an original equilibrium, with 
music, whose traditional structure (via the cadence) is to relieve tonal tension 
through a restoration of the keynote (Grundton). This bears upon the problem of 
anthropomorphism in that “classical” music since the seventeenth century has 
cast expression in terms of simulated human emotions: we hear music and 
perceive love, longing or fear, not to mention (in the case of pastorale) the 
“cheer” of birdsong or the “rage” of a thunderstorm. Adorno’s critique of this 
tradition, in which true expression is replaced by mere images of expression, 
theorizes what he calls a “tendency of the material,” extolling the composer 
whose sheer mastery of technique enables the material to go where it “wants” to 
go. What Adorno means by “material” is not merely the inventory of sounds 
available to the musician but the historical experience sedimented within musical 
convention. Nonetheless, I would like to attempt an argument whose parameters 
are Adorno’s “tendency of the material” and Jonas’ idea that freedom must be 
conceived as a “genuine potency” within physical substance.  
 
Kenneth S. Calhoon is Professor of Germand and Comparative Literature at the 
University of Oregon, where he is currently head of the Department of 
Comparative Literature. He is author of Fatherland: Novalis, Freud, and the 
Discipline of Romance (Wayne State, 1992) and editor of Peripheral Visions: The 
Hidden Stages of Weimar Cinema ( Wayne State, 2001). His publications cover 
topics that range from eigtheenth-century literature and thought through the early 
twentieth century, with film, the visual arts and psychoanalysis being particular 
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In 1974 German director Werner Herzog made the film Every Man for Himself, 
which dramatizes the story of Kaspar Hauser, the simpleton-foundling who in 
1835 mysteriously turned up in the city of Nuremberg and quickly became a 
cause celebre throughout much of Europe. Counterpart to the “wild children” of 
the previous century, Kaspar was greeted as a new epistemological informant—
the purported living witness to a vanished state of innocence. At one point in the 
narrative Kaspar insists that an apple, which he has just seen fall from his 
caretaker’s arms, is tired and should be allowed to rest. Kaspar’s mentor is 
adamant that his protégé not ascribe feelings to the insensate apple, and in order 
to instill in him a more Newtonian understanding of falling fruit and of force and 
motion generally, the kindly gentleman rolls the same apple along a path, which 
another man has blocked with his foot. Presumably the apple would strike the 
foot and stop moving. Instead, it strikes a pebble, bounces over the obstacle and 
continues down the path, leading Kaspar to exclaim: “What a clever little apple! It 
jumped over the foot and kept going!” The present essay focuses somewhat less 
on the human-animal divide (the topic of our conference) and more on the 
human-apple divide, though its deeper concern is with a natural scale along 
which human, animal, vegetable, even mineral, are continuous. Kaspar’s 
empathy for the “weary” fruit is predicated on this continuum, as is natural 
mimicry, wherein an animal or insect assumes the appearance of a leaf, rock, or 
other creature. Such sympathetic magic stands opposite the disenchantment that 
is the aim and idiom of modern science, to which Kaspar serves as a foil. The 
anthropomorphism of which his mentor would disabuse him is the bane of 
modern epistemology, which sought to purify knowledge of the taint of self-
intuition. Humans themselves are thus effectively implicated in a physical world 
that science has divested of life. The ambiguous vitality of imitative species 
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attests to the paradox of life, suspended as it is between being and non-being. 
Biological mimicry, which often entails the simulation of death, is animistic in its 
ackowledgment of the life-enabling potential of an organism’s environment. This 
essay moves within a constellation of trends in twentieth-century thought in which 
animism, anthropomorphism, mimicry, as well as mimesis, are marshaled as part 
of a critique of the broad philosophical-scientific attempt to dispel the subject’s 
felt affinity with its natural surroundings.   
 In a lecture from his Seminar XI, Jacques Lacan relates an experience 
from the season when, in his early twenties, and driven by the desire to “throw 
[himself] into something practical,” he worked on fishing boats along the coast of 
Brittany. He remarks on the harsh conditions and the stunted life expectancy of 
those for whom such work was more than a summer’s diversion. On one 
particular day, as the catch was about to be hauled in, a fisherman known by the 
nickname Petit-Jean pointed to a discarded sardine tin, glinting in the sun as it 
bobbed on the waves. “You see that can? Do you see it?” he asked, then added 
mockingly, “Well, it doesn’t see you!” This taunt, meant to confront the young 
Parisian with the fact of his being so utterly out of place, exposed the precise 
truth it contradicted, for there is a sense in which Lacan was indeed seen by the 
innocuous object. “It was looking at me,” he affirms, “at the level of the point of 
light, the point at which everything that looks at me is situated.”1 Set off against 
the foil of self-evidence, this contention rests on the foundational tenet of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, namely that the subject is instituted visibly, determined 
by the gaze, under which, in Lacan’s words, “I … turn myself into a picture” (106).   
 The subject, whose structure Lacan derives with reference to the specular 
image, is constituted in the awareness of being seen (74). It accommodates itself 
to this awareness, throwing up a picture—a screen to intercept the light that 
emanates from every point. Anyone who stumbles or trips and, on instinct, looks 
around to ensure that no one is watching is conscious of the impulse to withdraw 
from the “spectacle of the world” (75). We look around because we are “looked at 
from all sides” (72). Faced with a world that is all-seeing, the subject seeks 
refuge in the illusion caustically summarized by the fisherman when he says of 
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the floating sardine can: “it doesn’t see you!” The hills have eyes, however. This 
horror-film commonplace reveals a fundamental cognizance of the world’s 
panoptical aspect. Its complement is the paranoia whose antidote is the visual 
self-sufficiency of the small child, innocent of a gaze outside of itself. By contrast, 
the subject that sustains itself “in the function of desire” (84) encounters a gaze 
that, by definition, is not seen but “imagined … in the field of the Other” (85). 
Freud once explained paranoia with the example of a young woman who, in a 
state of sexual arousal, suspected that she was being secretly photographed 
from behind a curtain in her lover’s flat.2 This illustration is consistent with the 
general circumstance described by Lacan when he defines the gaze as “the 
instrument through which light is embodied and through which … I am photo-
graphed” (106).  
 Freud’s particular example, in which the young woman’s guilt is projected 
as an alien attempt to capture her desire on film, corresponds to the “imaginary 
capture” wherein the subject, divided between its being and its semblance, 
eludes the gaze by turning itself into a picture (Lacan 106). The picture is a pose, 
its contrary the ex-posure literalized by the camera in the case reported by 
Freud. Arrested movement, by means of which the subject adapts to the 
presence of an eye characterized by Lacan as voracious (115), is analogous to 
mimicry in the biological realm—an organism’s manner of assuming the color, 
texture, shape, and often stillness, of its physical surroundings. A reptile may 
simulate the sand and rock of the desert terrain. An insect may pose as a twig or 
protuberance of bark. One species of mantis, which resembles a eucalyptus leaf 
that has died and begun to curl, causes itself to tremble so as to mimic the rustle 
of a dry leaf in the breeze. In this way, the creature may be thought to elude 
death by emulating it—a feat it accomplishes by projecting an internal motive as 
an external force.3 
 Lacan’s teaching in this particular area draws heavily on the work of Roger 
Caillois, a one-time associate of the French Surrealist movement and proponent 
of what he called “diagonal science.” His claim that an insect’s ability to produce 
a likeness amounts to “genuine photography,” not to mention his treatment of the 
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eye (such as those that appear on the wings of certain butterflies) as an “organ of 
fascination,” is suggestive with respect to a theory of the subject that freezes 
before the gaze.4 Citing numerous examples from the insect world, Caillois 
disputes the commonly accepted explanation of mimicry as a mechanism for 
eluding predators or surprising prey. He proposes another instinct—one that 
“completes the work of morphology” by enabling the organism to assimilate to its 
surroundings, assimilation being not a means but the true aim of mimicry. 
Imitation is the result of a susceptibility to the very “lure of space” (98-99). At the 
level of the human, the organism’s tendency to imitate the surrounding world 
translates into a dissipation of personality. Biological mimicry corresponds to a 
class of mental disorders in which the mind feels disconnected from a specific 
point in space, just as the awareness of a distinction between self and world 
diminishes. Space comes to be experienced as a “will to devour” (100). Mimicry, 
in which animals assimilate to plant or mineral forms, entails the withdrawal of life 
to a lesser state (101). This decline in vitality, which Caillois terms an “inertia of 
the élan vital” (102), is not dissimilar from the death drive theorized by Freud—
the impulse, inherent in every organism, to return to the original, inanimate 
condition prior to the emergence of organic life.5  
 That this loss of self has a spiritual application is implied in Caillois’ 
discussion of Flaubert’s The Temptation of Saint Anthony, in which the hermit, 
whose state of exile is exposure itself, succumbs to the generalized space of the 
desert he inhabits. He falls prey to it, succumbing to the desire to “descend into 
the heart of matter—to be matter” (101). Asceticism, which is the way of the 
saint, is the spiritual correlate of the “death in life” that mimicry achieves.  
 A comparable kinship between spiritual self-mortification and the reduced 
existence of imitative species is pursued at some length in Thomas Mann’s novel 
of 1947, Doctor Faustus, the epic account of the life and death of the composer 
Adrian Leverkühn. A fictional aggregate of Wagner and Schoenberg, this musical 
autodidact proves himself a precocious master of abstract tonal relations. Indeed, 
he finds refuge in the disembodied intellectuality of these relations, his 
methodical evasion of musical key an effect of the detachment that defines his 
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relationships with people. His one true mentor, a certain Wendell Kretzschmar, 
has acquainted him with what he holds to be music’s “inherent lack of 
sensuality,” its “secret bias towards asceticism.”6 Adrian embraces the idea that 
the arithmetic procedures of Renaissance and Baroque polyphony amounted to a 
“prior penance” for the sensualism that would reach its apex with the Romantics. 
He advocates for an “ascetic chilling-off,” which leads him to favor “inorganic 
instrumental sound” over the human voice, whose warmth he characterizes 
condescendingly as “bovine.” Music, he claims, has “always yearned for … the 
lawful means of chilling things down” (76). His own compositional practice 
accords with the frigidity of his social life, as observed at the outset by his doting 
friend and biographer, the narrator Serenus Zeitblom: “All around him lay 
coldness” (8).  
 Adrian’s haughty dispassion is on display in the third chapter of Mann’s 
novel, which is taken up with a profile of Adrian’s father, Jonathan. A plantsman 
whose spare time was devoted to the study of natural science, Father Leverkühn 
sought to acquaint Adrian and his friend with those natural phenomena that, by 
Zeitblom’s estimation, bordered on the occult. On many an evening the two boys 
crowded behind Jonathan’s armchair as he paged through colored illustrations of 
exotic moths and butterflies, or watched as he demonstrated how intricate figures 
appeared when, using a cello bow, he would stroke the rim of a disk strewn with 
sand. Likewise, they examined under his guidance the plant-like patterns 
precipitated by the hoarfrost that covered the windows in winter. These latter two 
examples represent, respectively, the music and the cold that would combine in 
Adrian, whose own early “experiments” with chord structure amount to exercises 
in apathy. In retrospect, Zeitblom, a confirmed Humanist, characterizes 
Jonathan’s natural-scientific pursuits as having an affinity with mysticism and 
sorcery, his fascination being for those phenomena whose ambiguity straddled 
the divide between beauty and poison, and ultimately, between the living and the 
non-living. Ambiguity is something that Adrian later ascribes to the intrinsic 
“uncertainty” of tonal relations—the fact that any one note could be “augmented 
from above or diminished from below”—a quality he would also refer to as 
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“duplicity” (51). Leaving aside that augmentation from above is also the very 
definition of grace, let us emphasize that duplicity is a feature of those butterflies 
that dissemble by assuming the appearance of something else. With his many 
illustrated volumes Jonathan explained the “defensive mimicry” whereby the 
often exquisite markings of these winged insects—markings that sometimes 
reproduced even the impurities of the leaf they simulated—enabled them to 
vanish utterly before the eyes of their predators. The following example, which 
provides Mann’s novel with its signature leitmotif, is replete with associations 
familiar from Symbolism proper: “One such butterfly, whose transparent 
nakedness makes it a lover of dusky, leafy shade, is called Hetaera esmeralda, 
its wings smudged with just a dark splash of violet and pink, so that in flight, with 
nothing else visible, it imitates a windblown petal” (17). While some butterflies 
disappear, others float about insouciantly, their ostentatious decor a signal that 
they are vile to the taste. Yet another species, though perfectly edible, 
masquerades as its obnoxious cousin, sharing in the security the latter enjoys by 
virtue of its true indigestibility.  
 These revelations provoked spasms of laughter on young Adrian’s part, 
while his father, a reverent and brooding melancholic, appeared to empathize 
with these “sadly secure” creatures (18). Nowhere was Jonathan’s empathy more 
conspicuous than when he displayed the results of a certain chemical 
experiment: the sand at the bottom of an aquarium had been “seeded” with 
various crystals which, following the introduction of a solution of sodium silicate, 
had sprouted into a colorful muddle of “purely inorganic” forms resembling algae, 
mushrooms, tiny trees, even human limbs. Jonathan sought to instill sympathy in 
the hearts of his two novices by demonstrating that these “woeful imitators of life” 
were heliotropic. When the aquarium was covered on all sides but one and 
placed in sunlight, this is what the boys beheld:  
. . . the whole dubious crew—mushrooms, phallic polyps, tiny trees, and 
algae meadows, plus those half-formed limbs—bent toward the pane of 
glass through which the light was falling, pressing forward with such 
Konturen VI (2014) 	  
	  
89	  
longing for warmth and joy that they literally clung to the pane and stuck 
fast there (23). 
The wretched and grotesque display of limbs straining for the light—a spectacle 
that inspired amusement in Adrian just as it moved his father to tears—is a 
veritable diorama of Dante’s Inferno, parts of which Adrian will one day set to 
music. The Humanist Zeitblom recoils at Dante’s “penchant for cruelty and 
scenes of torture” (173) much as he bewails the horrors of modern German 
history, which the methodical torments of the Inferno seem to rehearse.7 
Zeitblom invokes the theologically inflected schism of body and soul in opposition 
to the “bio-politics” of Hell—the ultimate state of emergency—where the anguish 
of the soul is figured as sheer animal suffering. Adrian’s felt affinity for Dante’s 
great and terrible poem is consistent with his propensity for self-denial. Insulation 
from human warmth is not only the condition of his deal with the devil, it is the 
ideal by which he lives. Hence the habit of losing himself in thoughts of the cold 
expanse of intergalactic space, which is so vast as to be available to the mind in 
numbers alone. The experience of the mathematical sublime is itself 
commensurate with the “ascetic bias” of Adrian’s music, flight from desire being 
sublimation’s essential motive. Kant distinguished the subject of sublime 
experience from the superstitious individual quaking before thundering 
omnipotence, but the felt inadequacy of human cognition has its counterpart in 
what Zeitblom finds offensive in Dante: the nullity of man in the face of an 
inscrutable, unapproachable Good (172).8 The Humanist credo with which 
Zeitblom redresses Adrian’s surrender to the physical void is defined, in his 
words, “by proud awareness that [man] is not merely a biological creature, but 
rather that a decisive part of his nature belongs to a spiritual and intellectual 
world; by awareness … that [man] has been charged with the duty of 
approaching what is perfect” (288).   
 Implicated in Zeitblom’s reproach is Jonathan Leverkühn, the object of 
whose curiosity—even empathy—is the rough natural-scientific equivalent of 
Adrian’s own “inorganic sound.” Jonathan is indeed like the God of Creation, his 
eyes tearing up at the sad sight of those chemical excrescences—those images 
Konturen VI (2014) 	  
	  
90	  
of organic life before the fact. In reaching for the light, the sprouting crystals 
seemed to attest to a yearning on the part of matter to live. In his summary of 
Jonathan’s amateur endeavors, Zeitblom identifies a monism altogether at odds 
with the belief, espoused by Zeitblom himself, in the dual nature of man:    
If I understood our friendly host, what concerned him was the unity of 
animate and so-called inanimate nature, the idea that we sin against the 
latter if the boundary we draw between the two spheres is too rigid, when 
in reality it is porous, since there is no elementary capability that is 
reserved exclusively for living creatures or that the biologist could not 
likewise study on inanimate models (21). 
Zeitblom here isolates a kernel of the critique that Hans Jonas, in his book The 
Phenomenon of Life, was to mount against the dualism of body and mind that 
would cast—and castigate—Jonathan’s empathy as anthropomorphic. In fact 
Jonas, an erstwhile student of Heidegger, advocates for an “empathic study of 
the many forms of life.”9 At the heart of this “existential interpretation of biological 
facts,” as he calls it, is the contention that mind is prefigured even in the lowest 
forms of organic life (xxiii). Contesting the view that “subjective phenomena” are 
but the chance products of a “mechanical permutation of indifferent elements,” 
Jonas asserts that the very possibility of matter organizing itself for life must be 
seen as a “genuine potency” inherent in the very idea of physical “substance” (1-
2).  Indeed freedom, which we commonly associate with the “noblest” 
expressions of the human mind and will, has its first stirrings in the “primeval 
restlessness of the metabolizing substance” (99). “[E]ven the transition from 
inanimate to animate substance,” Jonas ventures, “was actuated by a tendency 
in the depth of being toward the very modes of freedom to which this transition 
opened the gate” (4).  
 The proposal that matter itself is possessed of a capacity for self-
organization, coupled with the idea of an “ascending scale” of formal complexity, 
may put one in mind of Adorno’s theorem, in his Philosophy of New Music, of a 
“tendency of the material.”10 By “material” Adorno means not some acoustical 
equivalent of atomic structure—not the sum of all possible sounds. Instead, he is 
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referring to the conventions of pitch, tuning, melody, harmony, key, mode, timbre, 
temper, rhythm, etc., which a given historical moment makes available to the 
composer. Denying that music consists in the “mechanical permutation of 
indifferent elements,” to borrow Jonas’s phrasing, Adorno argues that these 
conventions are the precipitates of social processes, which endow music with an 
immanent logic and thus with its own potential for progress. Only the composer 
whose ear is precisely attuned to the objective demands of the material is able to 
allow the music to proceed along its course. This entails making the correct 
technical decision—choosing the one note capable of shattering intuitions 
shaped by ossified habits.  
 An ideal of expression is supremely realized in the briefest compositions 
of Schoenberg and Webern, in which the truth of music is tantamount to “an 
eruption of negative experience” (34). Divested of its standard formulae for 
simulating human passions, music becomes a medium in which trauma is 
registered (35). Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle is at hand, and not only 
because of a shared concern with experiences that erode the sovereignty of 
pleasure, whose psychic antipode corresponds with the dissonance that 
Schoenberg and his circle liberated. The “relief of tonal tension,”11 which is the 
purpose of the traditional cadence, in which provisional discord yields to the 
primacy of the dominant triad, echoes Freud’s characterization of the aim of the 
death-drive: “the repetition of a primary experience of satisfaction.”12 We can say 
that the restoration of an abandoned quiescence, which Freud understands as 
the aim of the death-drive and of drives per se, translates readily into 
musicological terms as the resolution of dissonance. For Adorno, the recovery of 
tonal equilibrium, and with it the appeal to universal conciliation, runs contrary to 
the progress upon which the material, properly heard, insists. Likewise, the 
mechanism theorized by Freud precludes the direct and simple return to the state 
of reduced excitation: “The backward path that leads to complete satisfaction is 
as a rule obstructed by the resistances which maintain the repressions. So there 
is no alternative but to advance in the direction in which growth is still free” (51).13  
Konturen VI (2014) 	  
	  
92	  
 The foreclosure of immediate gratification comes in the service of Freud’s 
refusal to concede the existence of a human drive toward perfection. He calls the 
idea a “benevolent illusion” and declares that “the present development of human 
beings requires … no different explanation than that of animals” (50). The highest 
human achievements result from perpetual unpleasure—the inexorable tension 
born of the discrepancy between satisfaction demanded and that actually 
attained (51). The great work of art has libidinal frustration etched on its brow, 
albeit illegibly. Freud’s notion of sublimation supplied Adorno with a means of 
conceptualizing the movement of musical material—of explaining how “social 
tendencies are mediated by the creative individual at the level of instinctual 
drives.”14 While Adorno’s disagreements with Freud were legion, he was 
nonetheless able to describe radical music as a register of “corporeal impulses of 
the unconscious,” the earliest experiments in atonality as “depositions, in the 
sense of psychoanalytic dream-depositions” (35). Freud wrote very little about 
music himself, but he states in The Interpretation of Dreams that “dreams are not 
to be likened to the unregulated sounds that rise from a musical instrument 
struck by the blow of some external force.”15 Now, if the body of a violin were 
struck—and some modern compositions even call for this—the result would not 
be raw sound but the muffled echo of a particular, long-established system of 
tuning, not to mention the rational calculus that suffuses the instrument’s 
painstaking construction. But Freud’s loose analogy is fortuitous in that it seems 
to intuit the music-theoretical import of that later phase of his thought in which the 
focus shifts to the effects of trauma and to the ways in which the psyche 
accommodates blows it can no longer simply absorb. With respect to the avant-
garde, Adorno writes that “the seismographic record of traumatic shock … 
becomes the technical law of music’s form” (37). Expression that vacillates 
between convulsive gestures and riveting anxiety renounces all vestiges of unity. 
Harmonic flow and melodic line are subject to the same fracture that befalls 
personality itself.  
 The musical instrument jolted from without models the subject whose 
experience of trauma recapitulates the aboriginal moment at which, in Freud’s 
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words, the “attributes of life were … evoked in inanimate matter by the action of a 
force of whose nature we can form no conception” (46). For Jonas also, the 
primordial stirring of biological life is beyond knowing—a book with seven seals 
(3). And much as for Freud the memory of what for him is a “breach” persists in 
the neurotic mechanism that seeks retroactively to neutralize all such breaches, 
Jonas summons existential dread and the ever-present prospect of the “imminent 
no-more” as the trace of what for him was a bold and precarious first step: “The 
fear of death,” he writes, “with which the hazard of this existence is charged is a 
never-ending comment on the audacity of the original venture upon which 
substance embarked in turning organic” (5).16  
 That Jonas so readily employs metaphors of the epic voyage implicates 
The Odyssey itself as an allegory of the circuitousness that, by Freud’s account, 
is required by an impulse that aims not to thwart death but to ensure that the 
organism die from internal causes (Freud 46).17 That Odysseus circumnavigates 
the many hazards along his way comports with the essentially un-tragic course at 
whose end lies not destruction but rest. The asceticism discussed earlier is not 
dissimilar from the strategy of minimizing risk through renunciation. For Adorno 
(along with Horkheimer), the process by means of which Odysseus “survives 
only at the cost of his own dream” amounts to a “mimesis of death.”18 It is a 
process of adaptation wherein the disillusioned subject imitates the rigidity of a 
nature bereft of life—a nature that has been molded to the requirements of exact 
knowledge. The critique of the mathematical subjugation of nature is common to 
Adorno and Jonas, as is the assessment of the ban on anthropomorphism, which 
Jonas describes as a “strict abstention from projecting onto [nature’s] image our 
own felt aliveness” (10). Science sheds the last vestige of animism when 
understanding is purified of “the force-experience of [one’s] own body in action” 
(31).  
 The ideal of objectivity requires, in the tradition of Hume, that internal 
impressions not be “read into” the record of things. In the name of this ideal, 
knowledge grounded in the subject’s “inner mode of affectedness,” which 
enables the mind to map the sequence of disparate events onto a causal nexus, 
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is invalidated (Jonas 36). In the interest of preventing the world from “[intruding] 
dynamically into its testimony,” sight comes to be exalted as the physical sense 
least vulnerable to the flood of stimuli (30). The power of vision is that of the 
“distancing of its object from the perceptive function” (30). The organ of 
subjective self-disengagement, the eye substitutes image for effect (31), the 
distance inherent in the former being the necessary condition of imitation. In thrall 
to the visual, imitation keeps its object fixed in space and at a remove. It is 
distinct from—indeed contrary to—mimesis, which constitutes an involvement 
with an Other not fully demarcated from the self. Continuous with mimicry and 
magic, mimesis is closely akin to the animism whose every last trace modern 
thought had struggled to expel. This expulsion is consistent with the “mimetic 
taboo” that for Adorno is co-eval with repression as such.19 The primacy of sight 
during the Age of Reason completes the isolation of objects from subjects which, 
in the process of their being objectified, are severed from one another. “[Even] 
the human being,” to cite once more from Dialectic of Enlightenment, “becomes 
an anthropomorphism for human beings” (45). By excluding force from the field 
of what can be admitted as knowledge, science neutralizes that by which our 
own suffering and that of others is known to us. This progressive distancing of 
the object from us and from each other short-circuits true mimesis, summarized 
here by one of Adorno’s key interpreters: “Mimesis … is the affinity of subject and 
object as it is felt in one’s knees on seeing someone else stumble on theirs.”20  
 The fisherman who needled Lacan with a floating sardine can’s blind 
indifference (“it doesn’t see you”) is the unwitting advocate for the detachment 
afforded by sight and the concomitant removal of the perceiving subject from the 
field of perception. In its likeness to a far-off star, the twinkling tin is at home in 
the expanded, mechanical universe of modern cosmology, in which vast physical 
distance is the guarantor of knowledge untainted by embodied sentience. In 
keeping with the post-Copernican idea of a universe in which the laws of inertia 
hold sway over inanimate masses distributed in space, “dead matter [has 
become] the standard of intelligibility” (Jonas 74). (This is the standard by which 
Herzog’s Kaspar Hauser is judged an “idiot”). At the opposite end of the 
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spectrum is the animism and panpsychism that arose when the subject’s “felt 
aliveness” diffused over the whole range of experience. The first humans 
plunged their hands into the soil and, finding it teeming with life, found no reason 
to believe any part of it to be lifeless. Their experience yielded no evidence of 
lifelessness except for death as such, which had to be accounted for in terms of 
life. The funeral cult and, eventually, the belief in immortality represent attempts 
to assimilate death to a world in which life was the rule. In modern, post-
Renaissance thought, life becomes the exception, a “subtle hoax of matter” in 
need of explanation. Inanimacy is the norm. “The conditioning, life-enabling 
character of [the earthly environment],” Jonas writes, “is an improbable accident 
of a universe alien to life and indifferent in its material laws. All modern theories 
of life are to be understood against this backdrop of an ontology of death, from 
which each single life must coax or bully its lease, only to be swallowed up by it 
in the end” (Jonas 15).   
 If biological mimicry truly amounts to an assimilation to the apparently 
lifeless or less animate, it would corroborate this “ontology of death.” But this 
particular phenomenon may also attest to the felt affinity among the myriad forms 
of life. Indifference and assimilation crystalize as antonyms; the latter contradicts 
the former. To the extent that Lacan composes his argument as an effective 
rebuke of Petit-Jean, he implicitly aligns the fisherman with the proposition of a 
physical universe heedless of the human subject. To this he opposes the 
subject’s inherent photo-sensitivity—its manner of adapting to the light that 
arrives from every direction. It is within this framework that Lacan introduces 
Holbein’s painting from 1533, The Ambassadors: The sudden, inadvertent 
decipherment of the anamorphic skull startles the viewer with the awareness of 
being caught in the painting’s gaze. It sees you, and with a vengeance. It enacts 
the hypnotic power found in “even those [pictures] most lacking in what is usually 
called the gaze, and which is constituted by a pair of eyes.” Lacan here invokes 
the tradition of Dutch landscape, and it may be that the presence of the gaze is 
felt most uncannily in paintings focused on the materials of camouflage—foliage, 
branches, grasses, vines, undergrowth, etc.—and in which “any representation of 
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the human is absent” (Lacan 101). The subject’s very construction accounts for—
takes into itself—the all-seeing nature of the world. The eye-spots (ocelli) on the 
wings of certain butterflies suggest that the insect has absorbed the gaze and 
reproduced it on its surface, deflecting it by seeming to see.  
 Lacan follows Caillois in claiming that painting is to humans what mimicry 
is to animals, asking suggestively: “If a bird were to paint would it not be by 
letting fall its feathers, a snake by casting off its scales … ?” (114). Caillois 
devotes a great many pages to what he regards as the homologous relationship 
of mimicry to painting—a relationship that would indicate, in his words, “an 
autonomous aesthetic force in the world of biology.”21 Caillois makes this claim 
frequently, just as frequently anticipating the accusation of anthropomorphism, 
arguing however that there is a more deeply seated anthropomorphism behind 
the commonly held conviction that “nature does nothing in vain” (Mask 38). 
Caillois ascribes in fact a certain “vanity” to “the butterfly who plays with his 
wings, slowly opening and closing them on a flower, by a stretch of water or on 
the pebbles of the road” (38). This wording exemplifies the self-consciously 
fanciful character of Caillois’ presentation, though he is less capricious in pursuit 
of his more basic claim that natural selection cannot fully explain the rich and 
colorful displays that adorn lepidoptera. To be sure, the mechanics of flight may 
be seen as determining the structure of their wings. But function is not the author 
of the intricate and colorful patterns that embellish those wings. Instead, these 
colors, which are “enriched by various physical qualities [that] make them deep 
or glistening, metallic or moiré” (36), are striking in their superfluity. When Caillois 
refers to “electric blue” or “brownish velvet,” to “the enamel, mother-of-pearl and 
mica of numerous species,” to “crenellated shapes” and to “enormous stiff tails 
[that] appear to be starched,” it is as if he were cataloguing the excesses of the 
ancien régime—luxuries not subsumed under the “monopoly of the efficient.”22 
Caillois impugns the anthropomorphism wherein humans project their own 
utilitarianism onto nature, insisting that when we stop doing so, we cannot help 
but recognize that nature “squanders” its riches: “It is a world where there is 
nothing … to indicate that an ostentatious outpouring of resources, with no 
Konturen VI (2014) 	  
	  
97	  
intelligible end, may not be a wider and more universal law than the strict vital 
interest, the imperative of the survival of the species” (Mask 40).  
 Caillois hazards what Jonas works out rather more systematically, stating 
that “the intelligence of mankind and the purely biological phenomena … among 
the lower orders of life have, in spite of the abyss [that] separates them, a deep-
seated relationship” (Mask 35). Yet the similarity in their basic claims concerning 
this “deep-seated relationship” makes a key difference all the more surprising: for 
while Caillois believes that natural forms are not fully explicable in terms of 
function, Jonas holds that man alone “indulges in the making of useless objects,” 
and that this is what distinguishes him within the animal kingdom (157, 158). 
Common to both, nevertheless, is the resistance to the logic of natural selection, 
which is something they share with the fictional Jonathan Leverkühn. Observing 
how nature reproduces the external appearance of a leaf on the underside of the 
wings of a particular butterfly, he wonders: “why give a devious advantage to this 
one in particular? And though, to be sure, it serves the butterfly’s purpose when 
at rest to resemble a leaf to a T, what is that purpose from the viewpoint of its 
pursuers—the lizards, birds and spiders that are supposed to feed on it, but, 
whenever it likes, cannot make it out no matter how keen an eye they have? I’m 
asking you why so that you don’t ask me” (18).   
 This might be the place to stop, but please allow me a brief epilogue and a 
return to Werner Herzog, whose Every Man for Himself  I mentioned at the 
beginning. Kaspar Hauser has many cousins within Herzog’s body of work. One 
of them is Timothy Treadwell, the real-life subject of the more recent film Grizzly 
Man (2005). The eccentric and manifestly naïve guardian of Alaskan brown 
bears, Treadwell was the practitioner par excellence of domestic 
anthropomorphism. He spent his summers in the wilderness, “keeping watch” 
over bears he believed imperiled, addressing them in the voice of a kindergarden 
matron and giving them names like “Wendy,” “Tabitha” and “Downy.” Herzog 
harbors a cautious admiration for Treadwell, whose documentary footage is 
bejeweled with moments that reveal a kind of “magic of the cinema,” and whose 
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bouts of rage verge on incandescence.23 But he also distances himself from 
Treadwell’s benign view of the bears and of nature at large:  
And what haunts me, is that in all the faces of all the bears that Treadwell 
ever filmed, I discover no kinship, no understanding, no mercy. I see only 
the overwhelming indifference of nature. To me, there is no such thing as 
a secret world of the bears. And this blank stare speaks only of a half-
bored interest in food. But for Timothy Treadwell, this bear was a friend, a 
savior.   
These sentences accompany close-up footage that Treadwell took of a rogue 
male only hours before that same bear killed and partly devoured him. It is hard 
to consider this young man’s annual trips into the bear-filled wild without 
wondering what compulsion brought him repeatedly to this precipice—hard not to 
recall that “ontology of death,” from which,” in Jonas’s words, “each single life 
must coax or bully its lease, only to be swallowed up … in the end.” The various 
commentators, both within the film and without, who insist that Treadwell was 
“asking for it”—that his childlikeness in the face of mortal danger made him unfit 
for survival—may think they are siding with the bears. In fact, they proclaim the 
brutality of the modern circumstance.   
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. 
Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1998), 95. All 
subsequent citations in parentheses.  
2 Sigmund Freud, Studienausgabe, vol. 7, Zwang, Paranoia und Perversion, ed. 
Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards and James Strachey (Frankfurt: 
Fischer, 1982), 207-16. 
3 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno refer to a “mimesis unto death” (Mimesis 
ans Tote). Dialektik der Aufklärung (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1985), 53. 
4 Roger Caillois, The Edge of Surrealism: A Roger Caillois Reader, ed. Claudine 
Frank, trans. Claudine Frank and Camille Nash (Durham: Duke UP, 2003), 93-
96. All subsequent citations in parentheses. 
5 Freud, Studienausgabe, vol. 3, Psychologie des Unbewußten, ed. Alexander 
Mitscherlich, Angela Richards and James Strachey (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982), 
251-52.  
Konturen VI (2014) 	  
	  
99	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus: The Life of the German Composer Adrian 
Leverkühn as Told by a Friend, trans. John E. Woods (New York: Vintage, 1999), 
67. All subsequent citations in parentheses.  
7 See George Steiner, In Bluebeard’s Castle: Some Notes Towards the 
Redefinition of Culture (New Haven: Yale UP, 1971), 54. 
8 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp, 1977), 188–89. 
9 Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology 
(Evanston: Northwestern UP, 2001), 2. All subsequent citations in parentheses. 
10 Theodor W. Adorno, Philosophy of New Music, ed. and trans. Robert Hullot-
Kentor (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2006), 31-34. 
11 Claude V. Palisca and Brian C. J. Moore. “Consonance.” Grove Music Online. 
Oxford Music Online. Oxford University Press. Web. 5 Mar. 2013. 
www.oxfordmusiconline.com.janus.uoregon.edu/subscriber/article/grove/music/0
6316 
12 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. James Strachey (New 
York: Norton, 1989), 51.  
13 Shakespeare’s Falstaff, who after cheating death on the battlefield by playing 
dead affirms that “to counterfeit dying” is “the true and perfect image of life 
indeed” (Henry IV, pt. 1,  5.4.116–18), personifies the principle that Freud 
formulated: “The circuitous paths to death, faithfully kept to by the conservative 
instincts, would thus present us to-day with the picture of the phenomena of life” 
(Freud 46).  
14 Max Paddison, Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1993), 129. 
15 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, trans. James Strachey (New 
York: Avon, 1965), 155. 
16 For an extensive analysis of Jonas’ thought against the backdrop of the 
philosophical-scientific tradition it challenges, see Jazmine L. Gabriel, “The 
Problem of Life: From Mechanism to Surprise,” diss., University of Oregon, 2009. 
I am indebted to Dr. Gabriel for acquainting me with various aspects of this 
discussion. 
17 Also: “[Instincts of self-preservation] … are component instincts whose function 
it is to assure that the organism shall follow its own path to death, and to ward off 
any possible ways of returning to inorganic existence other than those which are 
immanent in the organism itself” (Freud 47). Freud’s view that the simple path 
backward is blocked is heard faintly in Adorno’s polemic concerning regressive 
trends within the institutions of music and of the inadequacy of historic solutions 
to present problems: “The quest for an age past not only fails to indicate the way 
home but forfeits all consistency; the arbitrary conservation of the obsolete 
compromises what it wants to conserve, and with a bad conscience it obdurately 
opposes whatever is new” (Adorno10). 
18 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: 
Philosophical Fragments, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott 
(Stanford: Stanford UP, 2002), 44-45. 
Konturen VI (2014) 	  
	  
100	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Michael Cahn, “Subversive Mimesis: Theodor W. Adorno and the Modern 
Impasse of Critique,” in Mihai Spiriosu, ed., Mimesis in Contemporary Theory 
(Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1984), 35.  
20 Robert Hullot-Kentor, Things Beyond Resemblance: Collected Essays on 
Theodor W. Adorno (New York: Columbia UP, 2006), 228. At the time of this 
writing, the world of intercollegiate basketball supplied a dramatic illustration of 
mimesis as just defined: Kevin Ware, playing for the University of Louisville, 
landed badly after a jump and shattered his tibia. The sight of the grizzly injury 
and of the young man’s much apparent agony left his teammates on all fours, 
unable to stand for weeping.  
21 Roger Caillois, The Mask of Medusa, trans. George Ordish (New York: 
Clarkson N. Potter, 1964), 41. 
22 The phrase is Adorno’s (Philosophy of New Music 29). 
23 Indeed, he says of Treadwell that “his rage is almost incandescent,” as if he 






Adorno, Theodor W. Philosophy of New Music. Ed. and trans. Robert Hullot-
Kentor. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2006. Print.  
Cahn, Michael. “Subversive Mimesis: Theodor W. Adorno and the Modern 
Impasse of Critique.” Mimesis in Contemporary Theory. Ed. Mihai Spiriosu. 
Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1984. 27-64. 
Caillois, Roger. The Edge of Surrealism: A Roger Caillois Reader. Ed. Claudine 
Frank. Trans. Claudine Frank and Camille Nash. Durham: Duke UP, 2003. 
Print. 
Caillois, Roger. The Mask of Medusa. Trans. George Ordish. New York: Clarkson 
N. Potter, 1964. Print. 
Freud, Sigmund Freud. Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Trans. James Strachey. 
New York: Norton, 1989. 
            . The Interpretation of Dreams. Trans. James Strachey. New York: Avon, 
1965. Print. 
Konturen VI (2014) 	  
	  
101	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 . Studienausgabe. Vol. 3. Psychologie des Unbewußten. Ed. Alexander 
Mitscherlich, Angela Richards and James Strachey. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 
1982. Print.  
            . Studienausgabe. Vol. 7. Zwang, Paranoia und Perversion. Ed. Alexander 
Mitscherlich, Angela Richards and James Strachey. Frankfurt: Fischer, 
1982. Print. 
Gabriel, Jazmine L. “The problem of life: From Mechanism to Surprise.” Diss. U of 
Oregon, 2009. Print. 
Herzog, Werner. Dir. The Enigma of Caspar Hauser, 1974. Anchor Bay, 2002. 
Film. 
 
 . Dir. Grizzly Man, 2005. Lions Gate, 2006. Film. 
Horkheimer, Max and Theodor Adorno. Dialektik der Aufklärung. Frankfurt: 
Fischer, 1985. Print.  
Horkheimer, Max and Theodor W. Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment: 
Philosophical Fragments. Ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr. Trans. Edmund 
Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2002. Print. 
Hullot-Kentor, Robert. Things Beyond Resemblance: Collected Essays on 
Theodor W. Adorno. New York: Columbia UP, 2006. Print. 
 Jonas, Hans. The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology. 
Evanston: Northwestern UP, 2001. Print. 
Kant, Immanuel. Kritik der Urteilskraft. Ed. Wilhelm Weischedel. Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp, 1977. Print. 
Lacan, Jacques. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. Ed. 
Jacques-Alain Miller. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Norton, 1998. Print. 
Mann, Thomas. Doctor Faustus: The Life of the German Composer Adrian 
Leverkühn as Told by a Friend. Trans. John E. Woods. New York: Vintage, 
1999. 
Paddison, Max. Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993. 
Konturen VI (2014) 	  
	  
102	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Palisca, Claude V. and Brian C. J. Moore. “Consonance.” Grove Music Online. 
Oxford Music Online. Oxford University Press. Web. 5 Mar. 2013. 
www.oxfordmusiconline.com.janus.uoregon.edu/subscriber/article/grove/music/06
316	  
Shakespeare, William. The Complete Works. Ed. Stephen Orgel and A.R. 
Braunmuller. New York: Penguin, 2002. Print. 
Steiner, George. In Bluebeard’s Castle: Some Notes Towards the Redefinition of 
Culture. New Haven: Yale UP, 1971. Print. 
 
 
 
 	  
 
